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ABSTPACI'
The financing of public ertployee pensions has becone an issue of grcing
public cxncern. This paper examines the fundinq status of teacher pension plans
for the fifty states and for selected localities for the decade, 1971—1980. A
pension underfunding equation based upon actuarial principles is specified and
estimated using a sanpie of pension plans for which actuarially soundneasures
of underfundings are available. The econontrically-estirnatedpension equation
is then used to "predict" underfundings for each state and localpension plan for
each year for which full pension plan data are available. The results reveal
that the real dollar value of plan underfundings has risen byover 50% in the
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The financing of public employee pensions has become an issue of
growing public concern. While the number of actual defaults are fey,
numerous recent estimates by actuaries and economists suggest that
there may be significant funding deficits in our public employee
1
retirement systems.Underfunding occurs because promised pensions to
current and future system retirees are not backed by an adequate
volume of accumulated assets and planned contributions. When an
underfunding occurs, either employee pensions benefits must be
reduced, or ouslic services must be curtailed, or taxpayer and current
employee contributions must be increased.
When the level of underfunding is small and the pension systen is
yong (a low currant retiree/membership ratio) such adjustments in
benefits, services, or contributions will be small and have few
serious consequences. For mature systems with large underfundings,
however, the conseiuences can be significant. As retirees claim their
promised pensions and the unfunded liability falls due, either taxes
and contributions must rise, or services decline, or pensions must go
unpaid. Either way, someone—— current residents, current public employees,
or retirees——will bear an unexpected burden. If the liability is
large enough, it may even precipitate a fiscal crisis in the public
budget as a whole.2The one possible "winner" when public pensions
go unfunded are earlier taxpayers who have left the jurisdiction and
1who did not contribute to the pension fund when the now retired public
employees were providing services. Once we realize that public
workers are paid a wage and a pension for their efforts, it is clear
that these prior taxpayers have not paid the full cost of the labor
services received. Unfunded pensions can act as a facto subsidy
from the current residents and/or retirees to the prior taxpayers who
long ago may have left the state or locality. This implicit subsidy
from underfunded pensions may seem unfair, may precipitate a wider fiscal
collapse, and, like most unintended subsidies, may lead to a serious
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toidentify the extent of pension underfundings for a major class of
public employees——teachers——as a first step to avoiding these unhappy
consequences.
Section II outlines the methodology used to estimate teacher
pension underfundings. The approach is econometric, rather than
actuarial. The analysis seeks to detail recent trends in pension
funding for the major state and local teacher and teacher—related
pensions plans; a detailed actuarial analysis of each plan for each
year is not possible. I have adopted an alternative research
strategy. I first specify——using the theoretical work of Ehrenberg
(1980) and Winklevoss (1977)——and then econometrically estimate——using
the actuarially—based measures of underfunding in Arnold (1981)——a
pension underfunding equation for state—local teacher and teacher—
related pensions plans. This resulting equation correlates
underfundings to commonly observed financial statistics and plan
attributes. In section III, the estimated underfunding model is used
to predict underfundings for major state—local teacher plans for the
2period 1971—80, given the plans' actual financial data and plan
attributes for those years. The concluding Section IV summarizes the
results and comments briefly on their policy implications.
II. An Econometric Approach to Estimating Pension Underfundings
A public pension is considered underfunded when assets currently
held by the pension plan plus the discounted present value of future
employee and employer (i.e., taxpayer) contributions are less than the
discounted present value of all promised annuity (i.e., annual pension
benefits) payments. Public employee pensions are defined benefit
pensions in which workers are promised a fixed fraction, called the
replacement rate, of some (usually three to five years) average of
their pre—retirement income. This fraction is calculated as the
product of the annual benefit accrual rate (typically .02/year) times
the number of years in service. Thus employees with 25 years of
service will receive 50 percent (25 x .02) of their average pre—
retirement income as their retirement annuity. To fund this annuity,
the employer—taxpayers may either wait until the employee retires and
then pay taxes at that time to cover each year's promised pension, or
the taxpayers can set aside a smaller nominal sum each year in a
pension account to earn interest so that the accumulated principal and
interest will be sufficient to cover the promised annuity stream when
the workers retire. This second strategy is called full funding;
the first strategy is called ttpay_as_you_go.t!3
To employ the full funding strategy it is necessary to estimate
the number of workers who will retire in each future year, how long
they will live once retired, their average pre—retirement wage, and
3the length of job tenure before retirement. This information is
sufficient to calculate the future stream of promised annuities.
Given an estimate of market interest rates, the required annual
contribution can be calculated which will be sufficient to fully fund
these future pensions obligations. These annual contributions are
called the normal costs of the pension plan. Typically, both
taxpayers and public employees will contribute to meet normal costs;
contributions are generally calculated as a percent of the current
public employee wagebill (e.g., 10 percent of wages). This percentage
is called the contribution rate. If past contributions which are
accumulating as plan assets fall short of the full—funding levels, an
unfunded pension liability will arise. To cover these past
shortfalls——often called the plan's supplemental liability—— added
contributions above normal costs are needed. These additional
contributions are called the plan's supplemental costs and are usually
calculated so as to cover the plan's unfunded liability gradually over
a thirty to forty year period. It is our task here to approximate
these unfunded pensions liabilities for the major pensions plans which
support retired teachers using a consistent methodology which will
permit across state and time comparisions.
Clearly it is not possible to do a detailed actuarial analysis of
each state pension plan for each sample year. I have therefore
developed an approximation which builds upon the earlier conceptual
work of Ehrenberg (1980) and Winklevoss (1977) and the careful
empirical analysis of state plans for the fiscal year 1978—79 by
Arnold (1981). First, a specification of pension underfundings is
developed for a typical defined—benefit public employee pension plan.
Second, the specification is generalized to allow for the unique
4features of individual pension plans. Third, the implied "actuarial"
parameters of the underfunding model are estimated econometrically
using Arnold's estimates of pension underfundings. The data base is
supplemented by plan characteristics abstracted from state pension
legislation. Fourth, using a statistically preferred underfunding
model and available pension plan data, predicted levels of plan
underfundings are calculated for each state and for selected local
plans for each year for the decade, 1971—1980.
At any point in time, a typical public employee pension plan's
liabilities (L) will equal the difference between the discounted
present value of promised benefits (PVB) less the discounted present
value of all future contributions from taxpayers and employees
(PVC): L =PVB—PVC.The liability not offset by existing plan
assets (A) is called the plan's unfunded liability (U): U =L—A.
Our task is to approximate U. To do so for a typical pension plan, I
shall assume: U)aconstant flow of (n) new employees each period
who exhibit a constant quit rate (q) and a constant mortality rate (6)
over an employment period of K years (i.e., mandatory retirement is
also assumed); (ii) a fixed contribution rate (c) of wages; (iii) an
annual growth in employee wages of g+h, where g reflects growth due to
worker experience and h reflects the inflation growth in wages; (iv) a
constant and uniform replacement rate (b) which when multiplied by the
worker's final wage (wF) defines the worker's annual pension; and (v)
a constant cost of living adjustment (COLA) to the annual pension of
rate (0) times the inflation rate (p). The analysis will discount all






where B(t) equals aggregate pension benefits paid in year t and C(t)
equals aggregate contributions received in year t. Thecurrentperiod
date of evaluation is denoted by the index o and an infinite plan
horizon is assumed.
The future wage of any worker at time v, who has been in the plan
for s years, will be:
hv gs (2) w(s,v)=w e e
0
wherew is the initial period wage. The final retirement wage of a
worker who started in the system at time (v—s) and has been in the
system for R years wil be:
F r(v—s)hlhR gR gR h(v—s+R) (3) w (s,v) =we Je e=
w0
e e
PVC is approximated in two steps. First, contributions into the
system at any time v are estimated by
(4) C(v) =JR_(q+8)s
wherec is the fixed contribution rate from wages, w(s,v) is the wage
of a worker with s years of experience in year v, and
is the number of workers of s years of experience who have
survived (quits and mortality) to time v. Contributions are
6aggregated over all workers from those just starting (s=o) to those
just retiring (s=R). Second. the present value of these annual
contributions are calculated by discounting by r summed over all time:
(5) Pvc =
f:c(v)edv•
Solving equations (4) and (5)givesthe following specifications for
PVC.
(q+&— g )k
(cwn) (l—e ) 0
(6)Pvc =
(r—h)(q+6--g)
PITS is also approximated in two steps. First, total retirement
benefits paid in year v is estimated by:
(7) B(v)= (s,v)e0 ne (q+R eds
where b is the replacement rate applied to the final wages of workers
of age s in year v adjusted for inflation protection in the post—
F Op(s—R) retirement years at the rate Op (w (s.,v)e ,s>R).Benefits paid
in year v are the sum of benefits paid to all workers who have
survived to retirement and are still alive (ne&
Second, the present value of these annual benefit payments are
calculated by discounting at r over all time:
(8) PVB= fB(v)e''dv.





The unfunded liability of a pension plan is defined as









using the definitions of PVC and PYBinequations (6) and (9)











8and (r—h) are "actuarial constants" dependent upon actuarial
assumptions. Equation (10') defines the level of today's (period o)
unfunded liability for a typical public employee pension plan.
To move from a typical to an actual pension plan requires a
specification of plan—specific features. These include the level of
benefits paid today (B), the plan's actual contribution rate (c) and
replacement rate (b), the level of the plan's accumulated assets (A),
the plan's rate of inflation protection (0), and the plan's number of
years of service before benefits are paid (R).5The other parameters
of (10') ——r,h,&,q,g, and p ——areactuarial parameters and, for
the purposes of comparing plan underfundings, are assumed to be equal
6
across pension plans.
In fact, equation (10') may not capture all the plan—specific
features which distinguish one teacher pension system from another.
Assets, for example, may be held in different portfolios which earn
different rates of return. Contributions may vary in some years from
the anticipated rate c because of short—term political decisions or
unexpected fluctuations in state revenues or non—pension expenditures.
In addition, the relationship in (10') is based on the assumption that
the plan is in a steady—state; in fact, the plan may be in an
expansion or contraction phase. Finally, teacher—only pension plans
may be differentially favored or disfavored in plan funding or
portfolio performance compared to those pension plans which include
teachers with all other public employees.
These observations suggest that the basic model in (10') should
be extended to include a fixed component dependent upon plan type
(G—O+01(T=1 if teacher only plan, 0 otherwise)), variations in the
9estimated actuarial constants because of variable plan growth.7 and,
finally a stochastic component related to the level of plan assets
(e =7A,where E(€) =AE(y)0, anda
2=A2a 2)
5 7
Equation (11) allows for these extensions:
(11) U =0 +0T+0m+(L(m))B+ o 1 2 r—h o
(—Ai(m))(,b)(B r—h o
-A+7A,
where m is the recent rate of growth in plan membership. Dividing by






Toestimate the effects of plan growth on the actuarial parameters
(r—h) and A, a simple interactive specification of the form
=1+imwill be tried; when it=O the actuarial parameters are not
significantly affected by the observed variations in m. Finally, as A
varies across pension plans as years to retirement (R) and COLA
protection (ep) vary, I have approximated the steady—state
10specification of A (see above at equation lOS) by the second—order






+ A4(Op— + A5(R—K)2
Substituting this approxisation for A into (11') gives the final
specification used in the econometric analysis.8
11Table 1 summarizes the econometric estimation of the underfunding
model estimated from a sample of thirty—seven pension plans for the
fiscal year 1978—79 for which full underfunding and plan attribute
data were available.9 Pension underfundings (variable U) are from
Arnold (1981) and measure plan continuation liability, the appropriate
measure of U under the politically plausible assumption that existing
pensions to current employees will not be terminated. (See Bulow
(1982) for arguments which favor using plan termination liability;
Bulow, however, is focusing on private pensions.) Data for plan
assets (A), benefits (B)1 and membership (to calculate m) are from the
Census of Government publication, Finances of State and Local Employee
Retirement Systems (1978—79). Data for each plan's required
contribution (c) benefit replacement rate (b), age of retirement, and
COLA (8) were obtained from state pension laws. In calculating the
benefit replacement rate allowance was made for whether the plan was
or was not integrated into social security. If full or partial
integration is allowed, I assumed social security replaced 27% of
employees pre—retirement wages when calculating b.1° In states, which
do not explicity allow for COLA protection, but do grant periodic
adjustments, I followed Arnold's (1981) assumption and set 0 =.5.In
calculating years of service (R), I assumed the typical teacher begins
service at age 30 and works without interruption to the age of
retirement.
Estimated equation (1) in Table 1 corresponds to the basic
nnderfunding model of (10') above, extended to permit a stochastic
error structure of the form, a =7A.The coefficient estimates for
this simple model imply values for the actuarial parameters of (r—h)




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 Notes to Table 1
u.s. =Notapplicable to specification being estimated.
o = Coefficientis constrained to equal zero, a priori.
* = Estimatedcoefficient is statistically different from
zero at the 10% level or better.
Go= Estimatedcoefficient for the variable (1/A).
01 =Estimatedcoefficient for the variable CT/A).
=Estimatedcoefficient for the variable (rn/A).
(hr—h)=Estimatedcoefficient for the variable (B0/A).
(—AIr—h) Est1matd coeffcent for the variable (c/b)(B0/A).
(—!/r—h) =Estimatedcoefficient for the variable (c/b)(B IA)
whenTaylorseries approximation for is
employed.
(—A1/r—h) =Estimatedcoefficient for the variable
(c/b)(B0/A)(Op —);Op =0.
(—A2/r—h) =Estimatedcoefficient for the variable (c/b)(B0/A)(R—);
R =24.
(—A /r—h) =Estimatedcoefficient for the variable
(c/b)(B0/A)(Op —)(k—); =0and R =24.
(—A fr—h) =Estimatedcoefficient for the variable
(clb)(B0/A)(Op —r)2 =0.
(—,t5/r—h)
=Estimatedcoefficient for the variable
(clb)(B0/A)(R-I) ;I=24.plausible and suggest even the simple model has captured the essence
of the actuarial calculation of U.
Estimated equation (2) extends the basic underfunding model by





T=1 if the pension plan applies to teachers only, 0 otherwise, and m
is the rate of growth of plan membership from 1971 to 1980. The
results reveal no significant fixed effect difference on underfundings
between teacher and general pension plans. This is perhaps not
surprising as most states now jointly administer teacher and general
employee plans. Bowever, the level of underfundings in teacher and
general plans can still differ as plan attributes ——B,A,c,b,Op,and R
——differ; all we observe from the "fixed effect" in equation (2) is
that there is no administrative bias in favor of, or against, teacher—
only plans. We do observe an almost significant effect of recent
membership growth on underfundings, however. The fixed effect of m on
underfundings is positive and becomes statistically significant in
later specifications. The positive effect of 15onunderfundings is
plausible; it implies new contributions in high growth plans have
lagged the new increases in liabilities. In results not reported in
Table 1, I also tested for the the effect of m on the actuarial
constants, (r—h) and A, as defined by estimated "slope" coefficients.
Multicollinarity prevented a precise identification of the effects of
m on the relevant slope coefficients; a simplier test that low growth
and high growth (m j .03 per annum) plans had equal actuarial
coefficients could not be rejected in the full model.1' Thus in the
work which follows only the intercept, or fixed effect, of plan growth
on underfunding is considered.
13Estimated equation (3) introduces the Taylor series approximation
for the actuarial constant, A. The more elaborate specification for A
has no significant consequences for our estimate of (r—h), again it
equals .022. The individual coefficients of the approximation
(A,it1,.A5) generally have plausible signs (see fn. 8 above), though
they are not always precisely estimated. The implied value of A is
again about 3 for the average sample plan. Estimated equation (4) is
a simple extension of equation (3) with thepriori constraint that
A4 =0(again see fn. 8) imposed before estimation. Equations (3) and
(4) are virtually identical.
Estimated equations (5) and (6) impose additional structure on
the estimation in hopes of improving the model's overall predictive
performance. Variables whose estimated coefficients are less than
their standard errors have their coefficients constrained to be 0,
first for the slope coefficients which define A (equation 5) and then
for the slope and intercept coefficients (equation 6). As expected
2 . —2. the R adjusted for degress of freedom (R in Table 1) rises with each
additional restriction.
Since our central concern is the level of underfundings, the
preferred pension funding equation is that equation which minimizes
the standard error of estimate of the aggregate level of pension
underfunding, U (assuming quadratic loss). The standard error of U
(SEE (U)) for each equation for our sample is reported in Table 1.
Estimated equation (6) is the preferred pension underfunding equation
by the criterion of minimizing SEE (U); it will be the basis for
estimating the funding status of teachers' pension plans for the
period 1971—1980,
14III. The Estimated Funding Status of Teachers' Pensions
Tables 2—4 summarize the results of the predicted funding status
of U.S. teacher pension plans for the decade 1971_1980.12 Tables 2
and 3 list the means across state plans and local plans respectively
for each year for four summary measures of underfunding:(i)
estimated underfundings per (state or local) resident; (ii) the ratio
of estimated underfundings to total plan liability; (iii) estimated
underfundings per plan member; and (iv) the ratio of estimated
underfundings per resident to income per resident. Table 4
illustrates the relative dispersion in underfundings per resident
across the best and worst funded plans for both states and localities.
The results in Tables 2 and 3 shows a general upward trend in
estimated underfundings of teachers' pensions. Average underfundings
per capita measured in constant (1967) dollars have risen by 65% in
all state plans from 1971—1980 and by approximately 33% for the full
sample of local plans from 1974 to 1980. General (all public
employees, including teachers) plans are less well funded than either
state or local teacher—only plans. As a general rule—of—thumb public
employee pensions are considered well funded when the underfunding to
liability ratio (or alternatively, the asset to liability ratio) is
less than .20 (greater than .8); see for example, Tilove (1976).
Clearly, the majority of the plans considered here do not meet this
standard; the underfunding/liability ratios in Tables 2 and 3 never
fall below .5. Further, the trend has been upward for all plans,
rising most sharply for the full sample of local plans. Underfundings
have also worsened from the perspective of plan membership;
underfundings/member in real (1967) dollars have risen for all plan









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Funding Status of Teachers' Pensions: LocalPlans
Mean Local Mean Local Mean Local Mean Local
Undorfunding/ Underfunding/ Underfunding/ Underfunding/
Resident Liability Member Income
1971* $163.09 .658 $15736 .060
1972* $186.50 .627 $16748 .064
*
1973 $184.62 .628 $16216 .065
1974 $117.19 .516 $10067 .042
1975 $119.57 .641 $ 9794 .042
1976 $133.70 .654 $10705 .044
1977 $147.94 .655 $10694 .048
1978 $164.40 .667 $11948 .050
1979 $156.44 .657 $11273 .050
1980 $155.55 .657 $11253 .051
*
1971—1973results are for a limited sample of local teacher
plans. Only local teacher—only plans are included, Local
teacher plans included in the analysis are Washington, D.C.
(1971—1980), Chicago (1971—1980), Duluth (1971—1980), Minneapolis
(1971—1980), Boston (1971—1980), New York City (1971—1980),
Portland (1971—1980), Milwaukee (1971—1980), St. Louis (1972—
1980), Fulton Co. Ga., (1973—1980), Des Moines (1973—1980),
Wichita (1973—1980). Kansas City, Mo.(1973—1980), Denver (1973—
1980), Omaha (1973—1980), Detroit (1974—1980), Arlington, Va.
(1977—1980). Underfunding per member and underfunding per
resident are both measured in 1967 dollars.than in general public employee plans. These levels of underfundings
per member equal from 50 to 70 percent of the present value of each
member's promised pension annuity (PYB in equation (9) above), again
13
measured in 1967 dollars. Finally, the relative burden of
underfundings on residential incomes is also rising. Public debt will
not stand as a serious long—run economic threat if taxpayers' incomes
grow as fast or faster than the growth in the debt itself (Feldstein,
1976). As Tables 2 and 3 make clear, however, this has not been the
case for public debt from the underfunding of teacher pensions.
The causes of the observed increases in teacher pension
underfundings are not difficult to find. While the average rate of
contributions as a fraction of payroll has risen slightly over the
decade, benefits paid to retirees have risen substantially. The
average benefit accrual rate has risen from .015 per service year in
1971 to .018 per service year in 1980, implying an increase in the
promised annual annuity of about 7.5 percent for an employee with 25
years of service (.075 =.018x 25 —.015x 25). Of far more
significance, however, has been the growth in the use of COLA
protection. Theaveragerate of COLA protection (Op) has increased
from .021 in 1971 to .048 by 1980 in state plans and from .01 to .025
in local plans. The large increase can be attributed to the
introduction of COLA provisions generally and to the high rates of
inflation experienced in the later years of the decade.
Not surprisingly, those state and local plans which have been
most generous in benefits are generally the plans which face the
highest level of underfundings. Table 4 summarizes the levels of
underfundings per capita for the worst—funded and the best—funded of
16Table 4
Dispersion in Teacher Pension Underfundings
a
Mean Underfundings/Res ident
State Plans Local Plans
10 Worst 10 Best5 Worst5 Best
1971$454.57 $31.52 — —
1972$474.61 $33.37 — —





1978$582.89 $78.80 $465.01 —$44.48
1979$643.79 $91.87 $393.64 —$42.11
1980$652.18 $84.60 $428.48 —$33.27
1967 Dollars
*these state and local plans. The state plans in Alaska (teacher),
Hawaii (general), Idaho (general), Maine (general), Massachusetts
(teacher), Mississippi (general), West Virginia (teacher), and Wyoming
(general) were consistently poorly funded while the state plans in
Minnesota (teacher), Missouri (teacher), New Hampshire (teacher),
Texas (teacher), and Wisconsin (teacher) were largely well—funded over
the decade. The local, teacher—only plans in Denver, Kansas City,
Mo., St. Louis, and Wichita were consistently well—funded, while those
in Washington, D.C., New York City, Detroit, and Chicago were
11
generally poorly funded. It is instructive to note that the worst
funded plans are generally found in our poorer rural states and in the
more industrialized cities. Yet importantly, not all rural states or
poor cities have poorly funded plans; New Hampshire, Wisconsin and
St. Louis, for example, make the well—funded lists.
Tables 2—4 take thi perspective of the individual states and
present averges of state averages (e.g., the average of state
underfunding per resident). However, if our poorest funded plans are
in our largest states, national underfundings per resident will be
larger than the state and local averages presented above. It is
instructive for purposes of comparisons to other measures of public
debt to calculate total underfundings across all the teacher and
teacher—related plans considered here; see Table 5. In 1980, for
example, the estimated underfunding of all sample plans was $175.03
billion or $775/capita (1967 dollars). This can be compared to gross
federal debt in 1980 of $371.67 billion (1967 dollars). Further a
recent study of the federal civil service pension system (Leonard,
1984) has estimated that plan's underfunded liability to be $220
billion in 1981 (again measured in 1967 dollars) When compared to






1971 $ 48.649 billion $337.59 billion
1972 $ 50.491 billion S349.00 billion
1973 $ 71.384 billion $351.91 billion
1974 $ 83.878 billion $329.18 billion
1975 $ 94.353 billion $337.53 billion
1976 $105.672 billion $370.62 billion
1977 $117.311 billion $390.69 billion
1978 $134.996 billion $399.39 billion
1979 $157.259 billion $383.53 billion
1980 $175.031 billion $371.67 billion
*Both debt series are measured in 1967 dollars.
**Source:Economic Report of the President, 1984, pp 282 and
306.these other debt levels, it is clear teacher and teacher—related
public pension plans must be included as a major contributor to any
aggregate measure of national public debt.
While the estimated levels of underfundings
observed here are troubling, they are not unmanageable. For most
state—local teacher pension plans, the benefit explosion of the past
decade is behind us and is unlikely to be seen again in the near
future. Most states have adopted COLA provisions and inflation is
likely to be reasonably managed in the future. Three
groups may be asked to pay: current teachers via benefit reductions,
current taxpayers via tax increases, or school—aged children via
reduced school services. In 1980, the stock of underfundings per
member in the average state—local teacher—related pension plan totaled
*11320 per plan member (1967 dollars) or approximately 60 percent of
each current teacher's anticipated stock of pension wealth (PVB). To
ask current teachers to pay the entire burden would be a considerable
hardship, particularly for teachers just now nearing retirement and
unable to adjust their private savings. Were taxpayers to cover
1980's pension debts, a one—time tax of approximately 3.3% on average
resident income would be sufficient to cover past underfundings in the
average state—local plan (.033 =*303.15of underfundings/resident
divided by *9186 of income/resident). Were school children to cover
1980's debts by sacrificing school expenditures, a one—time sacrifice
of *560/public school enrollee (1967 dollars) or 60 percent of that
year's average expenditure per enrollee would be sufficient. Of
18course, gradual repayment is possible. If we amortize the average
state's 1980 pension debt over 30 years at an assumed 10 percent
interest rate, a3110's of 1 percent annual increase in resident income
taxes or a 5.5percentfall in annual school expenditures devoted to
education will be required.
IV.Conclusions
The funding status of public employee pensions has become an
issue of increasing public policy concern.
Significantly underfunded public pensions are a possible source of
economic inefficiency and may have unattractive implications for
economic equity as well. This paper provides one estimate of the
funding status of teacher pensions in the United States and finds a
potentially significant level of underfunding in the average state and
localplan.
Many state and local plans—generallyfound in older, more
industrialized cities or in poorer rural states—-haveunderfundingS
which exceed *500/resident, measured in 1967dollars.
A balanced strategy of gradual debt reduction is still possible.
Modest tax increases (perhaps 3/10's of 1% of resident income) will
cover the interest costs of past pension debt and permit gradual
19repayment, without requiring benefit reductions to current teachers or
service cutbacks for students. But such a policy must be considered
in a wider context. Underfunded teacher pensions are only one source
of our nation's growing public debt. Federal government budgets,
social security, federal employees' pensions, and other state—local
employee pensions are all underfunded. If considered together,
the tax increases or benefits and service reductions needed to
service this debt may be sizeable indeed. Not all of the burden
of past public debt need fall on taxpayers; current
public employees and service beneficaries (e.g., school
age children) may be asked to share in these costs as well.
We should note that in one happy set of circumstances these
'ension underfundings will not pose an economic problem. To the
extent that taxpayers and/or teachers have correctly anticipated these
underfundings they will have made fully compensating adjustments in
their own savings behavior in expectation of larger future taxes or
smaller pension annuities. Further, the increased savings would have
been made possible by dollars given to current taxpayers by past
taxpayers in the form of lower land prices (the "capitalization" of
underfundings) or by dollars given to teachers as higher wage payments
(the "compensating wage differential" for underfundings). In either
case, the private market will have fully corrected for the failures of
the public sector. The evidence for this hypothesis is mixed at best,
15 however, and there are good reasons to be skeptical.
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1
See for example, Aronson (1975), Munnell and Connolly (1976), House
of Representatives (1978), Inman (1980). Pease (1980), Arnold (1981,
1982) and the Urban Institute (1981).
2
It has been argued that the New York fiscal crisis was in part a
fall—out of growing local pension costs; see Morris (1980).
There are special circumstances when the "pay—as—you—go" strategy
may be preferred to the full—funding strategy; see Samuelson (1975),
Arnott and Gersovjtz (1980), or Merton (1983). Generally, however,
full—funding insures a more efficient allocation of societal resources
(Feldstejn (1976) and Inman (1982)) as well as protects workers'
pensions. I shall assume full—funding is the desired standard in the
analysis which follows.
22This result follows from the solution to equation (7) for the period
v0.
The formal analysis ingores variation in vesting provisions across
pension plans. Vesting defines the minimal number of years of service
before pension rights are secure. The greater the number of years to
vesting, the lower should be the plan's unfunded liability since fewer
workers are likely to qualify for pension benefits. Vesting
differences will have to be substantial, however, before a sizable
effect on underfundings will be observed; see, for example, Bulow
(1982). In our sample, most plans vest their members within five to
fifteen years and these differences have only small effects on
underfunding estimates; see Arnold (1982) summarized in otlikoff and
Smith (1983, section 7.7).
6This assumption is appropriate given my decision to use the Arnold
data base. Arnold (1981) applies the same values of r,h,&,q,g, and p
to each plan when estimating that plan's unfunded liability. Thus, in
my econometric analysis these parameters are, by definition,
constants. If estimates of U are based on different values of
r,h,&,q,g, or p, then the regression analysis used to describe
differences in U must allow for variations in these parameters.
It should be noted that Arnold (1981) did test for differences in
mortality rates (6) across states and quit rates (q) across states and
could not reject the null hypothesis of equality. The nominal
interest r and the inflation rate p are national and thus should be
uniform across all plans in any year. The assumption of similar wage
23structures (g) and nominal wage growth (h) across plans also seems
reasonable as public employee bargaining is now commonplace.
The formula outlined in equation (10) above is not precisely
consistent with actuarial principles of pension accounting as used by
Arnold (1981) and others. Specifically, as specified the calculation
of PVB and PVC assume current taxpayers will be responsible for J,j
future employees benefits above all future planned contributions. The
usual practice when calculating U is to make current taxpayers
responsible only for current employee benefits. It is possible to
show that the algorithm in (10) will give a biased (likely upward)
estimate of this true" measure of underfunding. The bias is likely
to be greatest for plans with high rates of membership growth,
Permitting plan growth to influence both the intercept (a fixed
effect) and the slope coefficients in an estimated underfunding
equation should minimize the bias from employing the specification in
(10); see Ehrenberg (1980, fn. 12).
8
The coefficients A1.. .A5 have specific interpretations as first
and second derivatives of the actuarial constant A with respect
to the COLA rate, Op, and the years of service, R. For plausible
values of the other actuarial parameters in A, we can predict the
likely signs of A1.. .A5. For example, if h +&> Op and q +&>
g, then A1 =aA/a(ep)< A2 =8A/8R> 0, A3 =.5aA/a(Op)aR< 0,
A4 =.5a2A/a(Op)2=0,and A5 =.Sa2A/a2R>0.
All local teacher plans and thirteen state plans had to be
excluded from the regression analysis for reasons of incomplete
24estimates of U for the sample year, 1978—79. The excluded states
were Alabama, Georgia, Indiana, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, New Hampshire, Ohio, Oklahoma, Texas, Utah, Washington,
and Wisconsin.
10See Boskin and Shoven (1984), Table 3. For the simulation of
underfunding in years other then 1978—79, the social security
replacement rate was adjusted to allow for the actual historical
experience; see Boskin and Shoven (1984), Table 3.
The sample was divided into low growth and high growth plans
according to the criteria of whether plan membership from 1971—SO grew
less than, or greater than, 3% per year. For estimated equations (1)
the value of F for the null hypothesis of no difference was F (2,33) =
6.32;we can reject the null hypothesis of no difference at a 5%level
of confidence, For the full model specifications in equations (2) —
(6),however, the F statistic for the null hypothesis of no difference
did not reject the hypothesis; F (5,27) =1.831for equation (2), F
(10,17) =.706for equation (3), F (9,19) =.672for equation (4), F
(7,23) =1.049for equation (5), and F (5,27) =1.326for equation
(6). Since m is included as a fixed effect in equations (2) —(6),
the test applied to those equations is for slope effects only,
12There is always a danger in prediction of extrapolating to
circumstances outside the original sample period. This is not a
serious concern for our study for the simple reason that we are not
estimating a behavioral relationship to predict behavior, but rather,
25an accounting rule to help us organize financial data. The accounting
rule is valid across all periods of our sample, so our estimate of
that rule is also valid across all sample periods.
13
PVB can be approximated from equation (9) as B0/(r—h). B0 is a
plan's current payments to retirees and (r—h) is .022.
14
A data appendix giving estimated underfundings for each plan for
each year is available from the author upon request.
15
See, for example, Epple and Schipper (1981), Ininan (1982), and
Smith (1981,1983). My skeptism is prompted by the simple fact that
after five years of research into matters of public pension policy,
only this year did I bother to look up my own community's unfunded
liability. Do you know your community's unfunded liability? Perhaps
we are the nfra—marginal homeowners?
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